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Abstract
The revenue provisions of the Ethiopian Constitution are striking on a number 
of levels. By and large, the revenue provisions do not evince conformity with 
what the theories of fiscal federalism generally prescribe in the area of 
assignment of revenue powers. In addition, the revenue provisions of the 
Ethiopian Constitution are more detailed than their counterparts elsewhere. 
And, the Ethiopian Constitution departs from the assignment formula set for 
expenditure powers and prescribes a special procedure for assignment of 
‘undesignated taxes’. These features of the Ethiopian Constitution raise a 
number of questions and concerns. This article uses the income tax assignment 
in the Ethiopian Constitution to highlight some of these questions and 
concerns. There is ample evidence to show that the assignment formula adopted 
by the Constitution, indeed its predecessor - the 1992 law - was motivated by 
the desire to divide the power of taxation over existing taxes in Ethiopia rather 
than to reinvent the wheel. However, there might be a tension between the 
formula the Constitution adopts to assign tax powers and the prescriptions of 
the theories of fiscal federalism. The article explores the implications of this 
assignment.
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Introduction
With the exception of the brief federal experiment with Eritrea between 1952 
and 1962, modern Ethiopia operated as a heavily centralized state until the 
Dergue was removed from power in 1991 by a coalition of forces under the 
Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the ruling party in 
Ethiopia.1 A transitional period Charter was signed immediately thereafter, 
which put Ethiopia on a course of a federal-type structure. A law was passed in 
1992 to distribute revenue powers between the central government and the 
regional governments.2 This experiment with fiscal federalism culminated with 
the promulgation of the Constitution in 1995, which is the basic law that now 
regulates fiscal as well as other relations between the federal government and 
the regional governments.
The fiscal provisions of the 1995 Constitution reflect the political 
compromise that was reached by the dominant forces at the time of the writing 
of the Constitution. However, the assignment formula adopted by the 
Constitution creates a tension between what was politically and historically 
desirable at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and what might 
transpire in the future, particularly because of the unusual specificity of the 
Constitution in this regard and because the Constitution, in its revenue 
provisions, seems to disregard the importance of tax powers as instrumentalities 
of economic policies of re-distribution of income and wealth and stabilization.
1 The ruling party EPRDF is a coalition of four major parties - Tigray Peoples’ 
Liberation Front (TPLF), Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), Oromo 
People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), and Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ 
Democratic Front (SEPDF). These parties operate in the four major regions of the 
federation, including the capital, Addis Ababa. In addition, the EPRDF has its 
affiliates in all the other regions - the Afar People’s Democractic Organization in 
Afar Regional State, the Somali People’s Democratic League (SPDL) in Somali 
Regional State; the Gambella Peoples’ Democratic Front (GPDF) in Gambella 
Regional State, the Beneshangul-Gumuz Peoples’ Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF) 
in Beneshangul-Gumuz Regional State, and the Harari National League (HNL) in 
Harari Regional State; see Assefa Fiseha, “Theory versus Practice in the 
Implementation of Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism,” in David Turton (2006, ed.). Ethnic 
Federalism: the Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective, East African 
Studies, Addis Ababa University Press, Addis Ababa, pp. 156-157; Eshetu Chole, 
‘Keynote Address’, and ‘Issues of Vertical Imbalance in Ethiopia’s Emerging System 
of Fiscal Decentralization’, in Eshetu Chole (ed.,1994), Fiscal Decentralization in 
Ethiopia, Addis Ababa University Press, pp. ii, 167.
2 Proclamation No. 33/1992, a Proclamation to Define the Sharing of Revenue Between 
the Central Government and the National/Regional Self Governments, Negarit 
Gazetta, 52nd Year, No. 7.
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The assignment of income tax powers is a good example of the specificity 
of the Ethiopian Constitution. What the revenue provisions of the Ethiopian 
Constitution did was to divide the different income tax sources into smaller 
slices and share them between the federal government and the regional 
governments. it is known that the existing income tax system in Ethiopia is 
based (as has always been) on sources of income rather than the individual 
taxpayer who earns the income. All that the revenue provisions did was take 
these sources of income as they were recognized at the time of the writing of the 
Constitution and divide them between the federal government and the regions.
This article asks whether such specificity is desirable in the long run and 
raises questions of whether the Constitution can withstand major economic 
changes with ramifications upon the income tax system. The article, for 
example, asks whether the Ethiopian Constitution is broadly consistent with the 
normative theories of fiscal federalism, and if not, what the possible 
implications are going to be. For that, this article starts with a brief overview of 
the normative theory of fiscal federalism. Then, the article deals with the income 
tax assignment approach of the Ethiopian Constitution and forwards some 
theories about its inspiration - the scheduler orientation of Ethiopian tax being 
one of them. It also deals briefly with the practice of income tax law making 
(both at the federal level and the regions) and what that means or says about 
federal-state fiscal relations in Ethiopia. The major theme of this article will be 
the implications or concerns of revenue assignment under the Ethiopian 
Constitution from an income tax point of view. And finally, the article ends 
with some concluding remarks.
1. Theories of Fiscal Federalism In Income Tax Assignment
Few countries pursue the course of decentralization on grounds of its perceived 
economic efficiency or equity. Political, social, cultural or historical forces are 
likely to dominate the discourse of decentralization at the formative stage of its 
evolution and development.3 Nonetheless, some economists have sought to 
justify decentralization on economic grounds. one advantage of decentralization 
is that it accommodates diverse needs and preferences of citizens. since the 
benefit incidence of certain public goods is spatially limited, decentralization 
permits provision of these goods consistent with the various preferences of 
persons and communities.4 Related to this, it is argued that individuals attain 
greater freedom and responsibility when public goods are provided in a
3 Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave (1989, 5th edition), Public Finance in 
Theory and Practice (New. York: McGraw Hill), p. 446.
4 Ibid, p. 456; see also John F. Due and Ann F. Friedlaender (2002), Government 
Finance: Economics of the Public Sector (Delhi: A.I.T.B.S. Publishers &
Distributors), p. 486.
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decentralized fashion.5 Besides, decentralized decision-making approximates 
those of the market more closely than those of centralized provision because it 
allows for closer popular control over the provision of public goods.6 And lastly, 
economists believe that decentralization encourages experimentation and 
innovation in the provision of public goods.7
The normative theories of fiscal federalism start from the premise that tax 
powers (besides being a means of generating revenues for government) are also 
instruments of expenditure powers. Hence, a logical point to start is to identify 
the expenditure powers of the federal government vis-a-vis the states, and to 
allocate taxes that are instruments of these powers to the layer or level of 
government possessing those expenditure powers.8 That is why assignment of 
expenditure powers should precede the assignment of tax powers, for otherwise 
there is a danger of misallocation of tax powers to a layer that is not invested 
with corresponding expenditure powers.
in the realm of expenditure assignment, economists use the classification of 
the economic functions of a state first developed by Richard Musgrave, which 
views the role of a state as one of ‘allocation’, ‘distribution’ and ‘stabilization’.9 
without inviting much distraction from the main points, it may be in order to 
define ‘allocation’, ‘distribution’ and ‘stabilization’ functions. Richard and 
Peggy Musgrave describe the allocation function as ‘the process by which total 
resource use is divided between private and social goods and by which the mix 
of social goods is chosen’.10 Social goods (popularly known as public goods) are 
those goods which exhibit certain characteristics for which the market 
mechanism is unsuitable.11 National defense is a classic example of these goods.
The distribution function of fiscal policy calls for adjustment of the 
distribution of income and wealth in conformity with what society regards fair 
or just state of distribution. Here taxation may enter the process as an instrument
5 Bernard P. Herber (2005, 5th edition), Modern Public Finance (Delhi: A.I.T.B.S. 
Publishers & Distributors), p. 338
6 Ibid, p. 337; Due and Friedlaender, supra note 4, p.487.
7 Due and Friedlaender, supra note 4, at 487; there are of course downsides to 
decentralization, such as loss of scale economies and destructive tax competition; see 
Vito Tanzi (2001), On Fiscal Federalism: Issues to Worry About at 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2000/fiscal/tanzi.pdf> ; Herber, supra 
note 5, pp. 335-337.
8 See Anwar Shah (2007), “Introduction: Principles of Fiscal Federalism”, in Anwar 
Shah (ed.), The Practice of Fiscal Federalism: Comparative Perspectives, A Global
Dialogue on Federalism, vol. 4, (McGill: Queen’s University Press), p. 9.
See Richard and Peggy Musgrave, supra note 3, pp.3-14.
10Ibid, p. 6. 
Ibid, p. 7.
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of transfer of income and wealth from the high income to low income 
households.12 And stabilization function has the objective of maintaining high 
employment, reasonable degree of price level stability (in other words, fighting 
inflation) and an appropriate level of economic growth.13 Again taxes enter the 
picture as fiscal instruments to achieve any or all of the above objectives.14 
There are disagreements among economists and politicians over how much (and 
sometimes if) governments are in a position to deal with these issues. once the 
issues are settled, however, taxation is definitely one of the most prominent 
instruments for achieving these economic and political objectives.
Economists generally believe that the allocation function of the public 
sector is subject to wider decentralization to lower levels of government while 
the other two (distribution and stabilization) functions are beneficially reserved 
to the central/federal government.15 In the division of allocation functions of 
government, one principle that is frequently invoked is the ‘subsidiarity 
principle’, which supports assignment to the lowest order of government (or the 
government closest to the people) unless there are compelling arguments for 
assignment to the higher orders of government.16 The principle of ‘subsidiarity’ 
is also supported on grounds of efficiency. Efficiency demands that the 
jurisdiction that has control over the minimum geographic area capable of 
internalizing the benefits as well as costs should be charged with the 
responsibility of providing the service.17 Local and state governments are the 
primary candidates for the provision of most public goods on grounds of 
efficiency. Local and state governments understand the concern of local 
residents better; they are more responsive to the people for whom the services 
are intended; and unnecessary layers of jurisdiction (in other words 
bureaucracies) are eliminated and competition and innovations are enhanced 
when local and regional jurisdictions assume the provision of public goods.18 
only public goods for which compelling cases can made for national provision 
should be retained by the federal government. The compelling grounds are the 
existence of substantial externalities or economies of scale and countervailing
12 The distribution function may be achieved through progressive taxes combined with 
subsidies of low income households or financing of public services catering primarily 
for low income households (e.g. subsidized low income housing), see Richard and 
Peggy Musgrave supra note 3, pp.6 and 11.
13 Ibid, p. 6.
14 Ibid, p.13.
15 Ibid, p. 455. See also, Charles M. Tiebout (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures”, the Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 64, No. 5, at 418.
16 Anwar Shah, supra note 8, p. 8.
17 Ibid, p. 9.
18 Ibid.
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administrative and compliance costs.19 With the exception of national public 
goods like national defense, many other public services can be decentralized to 
the states and local governments.
The literature on fiscal federalism has a contrary advice with respect to the 
assignment of both distribution and stabilization functions. The reason in both 
cases is the fear of leakage that might result from disparate regional and/or local 
policies of distribution and stabilization.20 in the area of distribution, for 
example, no regional or local government could be effective in its distributive 
goals if other regions move in an opposite direction.21 Similarly, no regional 
and/or local government can be effective in stabilizing its economy when its 
efforts can be readily undermined through leakage resulting from the 
contradictory activities of other regions or localities.
The theories of fiscal federalism in the areas of revenue assignment are not of 
peremptory nature. Federal systems will do well to heed these normative 
theories, but departures from them are tolerated, and indeed many federal 
systems do not strictly adhere to these theories. That is why we observe 
divergent approaches of revenue assignment in different federal systems, which 
goes to show that fiscal federalism is not just about economics. in any case, 
based largely on the expenditure assignments in federal systems, the normative 
theories of fiscal federalism suggest the following criteria in the assignment of 
revenue powers:22
(i) progressive redistributive taxes should be central;
(ii) taxes suitable for economic stabilization should be central; lower level 
taxes should be cyclically stable;
(iii) tax bases distributed highly unequally between jurisdictions (e.g., 
resource taxes) should be centralized; taxes on mobile factors of 
production are best administered at the center;
(iv) taxes based on residence (e.g., sales of consumption goods to consumers 
or excises) are suited for states;
(v) taxes on immobile factors (e.g., property taxes) are better left for local 
levels;
(vi) benefit taxes and user charges might be used at all levels.
19 Ibid, p. 10.
20 Richard and Peggy Musgrave, supra note3, pp. 454-455; Due and Friedlaender, supra 
note 4, p. 486.
21 For contrary arguments, see Anwar Shah, supra note 8, pp. 11-13.
22 Kibre Moges (1994), ‘The Conceptual Framework for Fiscal Decentralization’, in 
Eshetu Chole (ed.), supra note 1, pp 5-6 quoting Anwar Shah, Perspectives in the 
Design of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations (1991), WPS, World Bank.
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The following table shows the broad distribution of taxes if the theory of fiscal 
federalism were to hold sway:
Table 1: Tax Assignment according to the theory of Fiscal Federalism
Tax Category Determination of Tax Collection 
and
Administration
Base Rate
Customs duties F F F
Income Tax F F, S F
Estate & Gifts F F, S F
Corporate Income Taxes F F, S F
Resource Taxes F F, S F
Retail Sales S S S
vat F F, S F
Excises S S S
Property tax S L L
User charges F, S, L F, S, L F, S, L
Source: Kibre Moges23 Table 2, quoting Shah24 
Notes: F = Federal S = State L = Local
2. Assignment of Income Tax Powers: The Impact of the 
Schedular System on the Constitution
Federal systems do not exhibit any pattern of uniformity in allocating income 
taxes.* 24 25 Although not conclusive, there appears to be some differences in 
approaches between those federal systems that have a global system of income 
taxation and those that have adopted schedular approaches of income taxation.26
3 See Ibid, p. 6.
24 Anwar Shah, supra note 22.
25 Solomon Negussie (2006), Fiscal Federalism in Ethiopian Ethnic-Based Federal 
System (Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publishers), p. 127.
26 The schedular approach of income taxation, still in use in some countries including 
Ethiopia, segments income by sources. Each schedule of the income tax has its own 
rules of computation of gross income, taxable income, tax rates, and methods of
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Countries with global system of income taxation tend to allocate income taxes to 
the federal government while those with schedular system of income taxation 
tend to share income taxes between the federal government and states.27 The 
Ethiopian Constitution of 1995 seems to follow a set formula in allocating 
income tax powers between the federal government and the regional 
governments. with respect to employment income taxes (i.e., taxes on wages 
and emoluments),28 the Constitution allocates them on the basis of the identity 
of the employer. if the employer is the federal government or an international 
organization, the federal government exercises an exclusive power of taxation of 
employment income.29 if an employer is anyone other than these two (that 
includes regional governments, private enterprises and non-governmental 
organizations), the power to impose tax on employment income belongs to the 
regional governments.30 incidentally, some have argued that employment 
income taxes are assigned to the regional governments on grounds of the 
benefits employees receive from regional governments. 31 if employment
assessment. in contrast global income tax systems aggregate the income of a person 
from ‘all’ sources and apply the tax rate on the whole. In reality, there are no pure 
global systems of income taxation. Some types of income (e.g. capital gains) may 
receive special treatment in an otherwise global income tax system; see John Tiley 
(2005, 5th.ed.), Revenue Law, Hart Publishing, p. 136; see also Lee Burns and 
Richard Krever, Individual Income Tax, in Victor Thuronyi (1998, ed.), Tax Law 
Design and Drafting, International Monetary Fund, Vol. 2, pp,. 495-496.
As Holmes noted:
“[u]nder the global system of income taxation, all income, regardless of its source is 
aggregated and subjected to a single schedule. The purpose of the global approach is 
‘to distribute interpersonal tax burdens, vertically and horizontally, according to the 
ability to pay principle’. Aggregating income under a global tax renders a 
progressive tax scale more effective (vertical equity) and does not discriminate 
between income from different sources (horizontal equity). Taxation under the 
schedular system identifies income by source and imposes tax, sometimes at different 
rates, separately on the total income derived in each source clarification.” Kevin 
Holmes (2001), The Concept of Income: A Multidisciplinary Analysis (The 
Netherlands: IBFD Publications), p. 28.
27 Solomon Nigussie, supra note 25, p. 127.
28 Employment income taxes are sometimes mistakenly referred to as ‘personal income 
taxes’ in Ethiopia. There are no personal income taxes in Ethiopia, in the strictest 
sense of the expression.
29 The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Federal Negarit 
Gazetta, 1st Year, No. 1, Article 96(2); Solomon Nigussie, supra note 25, p. 127.
30 Constitution , supra note 29, Article 97(1).
31 Solomon, for example, writes that the allocation of personal income taxes to the 
regional governments is justified because these taxes, according to him, finance local 
public goods and services; see Solomon Nigussie, supra note 25, p. 128.
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income taxes are cast as ‘benefit taxes’, it may be justified to assign these taxes 
to the regional governments, but that is not the reason.32 Employment income 
taxes are assigned on the basis of the identity of the employers, rather than the 
residence of the employees. it is difficult to see how the benefits employees 
receive can be gleaned from the identity of the employers. If benefits were the 
reason why employees are subject to regional tax powers, employees of the 
federal government and international organizations working and residing in the 
regions should also also pay these taxes to the respective regional governments 
of which they are residents.
The formulaic allocation of income taxes extends to other sources of 
income subject to tax in Ethiopia. Income tax on business profits is allocated on 
the basis of ownership of the business or the legal form of business organization. 
The federal government is given exclusive power of taxation of profits 
generated by government enterprises owned by the federal government.33 The 
regional governments hold exclusive power of taxation over government 
enterprises owned by the regional governments and private sole-proprietorship 
businesses.34 The regional governments also hold an exclusive power of taxation 
of income from agricultural activities, as long as the income is derived by 
private farmers and cooperative societies.35 The Constitution assigns taxation of 
corporate income as well as income of shareholders concurrently to the federal 
government and the regional governments.36
The other source of income tax which undergoes a similar formula of 
‘slicing the pie’ is rental income tax. This source of income is divided by the 
Constitution between the federal government and regional governments based
32 See Richard and Peggy Musgrave, supra note 3, p. 454. The distinction between 
benefit-based taxes and general purpose taxes is a matter of degree rather than of 
substance. In principle, all taxes must be based on the benefits derived from public 
services. But specific benefits need not be (and in some cases cannot be) proved for 
taxes to become general obligations on individual taxpayers. unlike in the general 
purpose taxes, however, there is a strong link between the taxes and the benefits 
taxpayers receive in the case of benefit-based taxes. Excise taxes on petroleum, for 
example, are justified by the benefits road users derive from the construction and 
maintenance of roads. These taxes are not general purpose taxes. Their burdens fall 
on road users only. similarly, income taxes may be used particularly at the local 
government level to impose the burden of local government services on residents of 
the locality only. Residence becomes an indirect identifier of the beneficiaries of 
local government services.
33 These are profit-making enterprises; Constitution, supra note 29, Article 96(3).
34 Ibid, Article 97(4) & (7).
35 Ibid, Article 97(3).
36 Ibid, Article 98(2).
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on the identity of the ‘lessor’ or ‘landlord’. If the lessor is the federal 
government (in other words, if the federal government owns the building 
leased), the Federal Government has an exclusive power of taxation over that 
source of income.37 The power to impose tax on rental income derived from any 
other property (this includes all regional government owned properties and 
privately-owned properties) is exclusively given to the regional governments.38
As can be readily observed, the Ethiopian Constitution goes to great lengths 
in listing the tax powers of both the federal government and the regional 
governments in a language as concrete as can be imagined. But if Article 99 
were any evidence, there was no intention to exhaust all the tax powers, much 
less the income tax powers. Those taxes which are not expressly stated in 
Articles 96, 97 and 98 are regarded as ‘undesignated’ and should undergo 
allocation by the 2/3rds majority vote of the two Houses.39 In providing for this 
special procedure to settle the locus of ‘undesignated taxes’, the Constitution 
departs form the principle of ‘residuality’, which is followed in the area of 
expenditure assignment.40
It is now more than fifteen years since the Constitution was approved. Since 
the approval of the Constitution in 1995, the Joint Houses met and voted to 
allocate certain income taxes which were undesignated by the Constitution.41 
The Joint Houses designated income taxes on royalties derived by enterprises as 
‘concurrent’ taxes and royalties derived by individuals as ‘regional’ taxes.42 
There are still many more undesignated and yet to be discovered income tax 
sources awaiting determination of the two Houses. 43
In thinking about the Ethiopian Constitution, we may wonder as to what 
could have motivated the framers of the Constitution to divide income tax 
powers (indeed all tax powers) in such a particular and specific manner. In 
attempting answers to this question, we may postulate four different hypotheses:
37 Ibid, Article 96(6).
38 Ibid, Article 97(6).
39 Ibid, Article 99.
40 Ibid, Article 52(1).
41 Berhanu Assefa (2006). Undesignated Powers of Taxation in the Distribution of 
Fiscal Powers between the Central and State Governments under the FDRE 
Constitution, LL.B Thesis, Faculty of Law Library, Archives, pp. 59-60.
42 Ibid.
43 Capital gains taxes (although stated as taxable in the Federal Income Tax 
Proclamation) are arguably undesignated taxes; see Income Tax Proclamation No. 
286/2002, Federal Negarit Gazetta, 8th year, No. 34, Article 37; There are also many 
other types of income not even anticipated under the current income tax laws of 
Ethiopia - annuities are a good example.
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(i) The general normative theories of fiscal federalism as developed mainly 
by economists;
(ii) The comparative experience of other federal systems;
(iii) The division of revenues during the Transition Period (1992-1995); or
(iv) The schedular feature of Ethiopian income tax system on the ground.
We may dismiss the first hypothesis (the normative theory of fiscal federalism) 
as the most improbable, for we quickly notice what little resemblance there is 
between what the normative theory prescribes and how the Ethiopian 
constitution divides tax powers. The normative theories of fiscal federalism 
generally favor assignment of income taxes to the federal government, which is 
clearly not the case for the Ethiopian Constitution. Besides the normative 
theories of fiscal federalism seldom get into as many details as the Ethiopian 
Constitution does. it is unlikely that the framers had the normative theories of 
fiscal federalism in mind in writing the revenue provisions of the Constitution.
Comparative experience also has little influence over the revenue 
provisions of the Ethiopian Constitution except perhaps in shaping the 
provisions of the law that preceded the Ethiopian Constitution - Proclamation 
No. 33/1992- in regulating division of revenues in the Ethiopian federal system. 
The details of the Ethiopian Constitution in this regard are almost 
unprecedented. No Constitution to my knowledge goes to as much detail as the 
Ethiopian Constitution in allocating tax powers between the two layers of the 
federation. The Indian Constitution is fairly detailed on matters of tax power 
sharing, but not even the Indian Constitution comes close to the Ethiopian 
Constitution.44
That leaves us with the two hypotheses left. There is reason to believe that 
the 1992 law and the schedular design of the Ethiopian income tax system had 
something to do with shaping the revenue provisions of the Ethiopian 
Constitution. The 1992 law regulated the division of revenues during the 
Transition Period and the political forces that dominated during the transition 
period were also the forces that shaped the writing of the Constitution. A 
cursory comparison of the 1992 law with the Constitution’s revenue provisions 
cannot pass without noticing the striking resemblance between the two laws. To 
be sure, there are minor differences of language, but their similarity is striking 
overall. The categories of revenues are similar; the types of taxes that are
44 We may consult the Constitutions of the Swiss, Canadian, Australian, Nigerian, and 
Indian Constitutions. None of them are as detailed as the Ethiopian Constitution. The 
us Constitution does not even bear comparison; see Constitutions of the World at 
<http://www.constitution.org/cons/natlcons.htm> last visited on December 6, 2009.
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categorized as federal, state or concurrent are also similar.45 The details are also 
strikingly similar, if not downright identical. There is one area where the 1992 
law clearly had an upper hand over the Constitution - it has more rules about 
revenue sharing than does the Constitution, obviously because the 1992 law 
dealt with revenue sharing and revenue sharing only, whereas the Constitution, 
like any constitution, deals with many matters other than just revenue sharing.
The 1992 law is abrogated by the Constitution, but it has thrown many a 
light over matters that were left unsaid or said ambiguously by the Constitution 
(although this is not publicly acknowledged). For instance, the Constitution says 
nothing about the levying and collection of concurrent taxes but the 1992 law 
has a clear provision on this which states that concurrent taxes are fixed and 
collected by the central (federal) government and then shared with the regions 
on the basis of derivation.46 When the Joint Houses determined the formula of 
sharing revenues from concurrent sources, their decision went the way of the 
procedures laid down in the 1992 law. This is more than mere coincidence. The 
1992 law is the voice behind the silences and ambiguities of the 1995 
Constitution.
We may trace the Constitution’s revenue provisions to the 1992 law, but to 
what do we trace the 1992 law itself? This takes us to the design of the income 
tax system of Ethiopia - the fourth hypothesis. in reading the revenue provisions 
of the Constitution, one cannot but be struck by the conservative approach of the 
framers of the Constitution. We quickly realize that they did not set out to 
‘reinvent the wheel’ but to allocate existing taxes on the basis of simple 
indicators like the identity of employers, lessors or the form of business 
organizations. It is instructive to note that neither the 1992 law nor the 1995 
Constitution occasioned a reform of the tax system to bring into conformity with 
the division of revenues, because both laws required division of existing taxes 
rather than reorganizing the tax system on the ground. No major income tax 
reform occurred until seven years after the Constitution, and the major income 
tax reforms of 2002 do not seem to have been motivated by the Constitution but 
by factors that had little to do with the federal arrangement.
it is difficult to imagine the division of revenues like that of the Ethiopian 
Constitution without the schedular income tax system on the ground. Since the 
revenue provisions divide revenues from existing taxes, they were more specific 
and more particular than the schedules of the income tax - that could not have
45 Compare Article 96 of the Constitution with Article 5(2) of Proclamation No. 
33/1992; Article 97 of the Constitution with Art. 5(3) of Proclamation No. 33/1992; 
and Art. 98 of the Constitution with Article 5(4) of Proclamation No. 33/1992, supra 
notes 2 and 29.
46 See supra note 2, Article 8(4).
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been avoided unless the sharing was based strictly on the existing schedules. If 
we scrutinize the revenue provisions of the Constitution closely, we realize that 
these provisions make reference to the existing income tax sources like 
employment, business, lease and agriculture to allocate tax powers over those to 
either or both layers of the federation. We can assign schedules to each of these 
sources mentioned in the Constitution or trace them to some of the autonomous 
income tax laws of Ethiopia, like the agricultural income tax laws and the 
mining income tax law. Those who worked out the assignment formulas of the 
Constitution most likely had a copy of the existing taxes of Ethiopia at the time 
and simply decided to allocate the taxes on criteria that seemed to them could be 
executed without a hitch on the ground.
3. Income Tax Lawmaking in Practice
For many years after the passing of the Constitution, the regional governments 
simply used the federal tax laws as source of authority to levy and collect 
regional taxes, including income taxes.47 48 The turnover tax law, for example, is a 
federal tax law, but the tax is collected mostly by the regional governments. 
some have wondered if this practice had any constitutional basis, but since 
taxpayers mounted no challenge, the practice has so far attracted little 
attention.
The one area of taxation powers where the regional governments have 
shown some legislative muscle is in the agricultural income taxes, presumably 
because these taxes are the exclusive preserve of the regions.49 In recent times, 
however, some regional governments have managed to pass their own income
47 Timothy R. Muzondo et al (2000), “Ethiopia: Introduction of a VAT and a 
Presumptive Income Tax and Reform of the Income Tax”, International Monetary 
Fund, Fiscal Affairs Department, p.21.
48 Ibid; the challenge would have spurred the regional governments to issue their own 
tax law, which was very easy to do. An otherwise savvy taxpayer might frown upon 
such practice but decide against challenging it because he knew that the regions could 
produce their own tax laws upon instant notice.
49 There is even some variation among regions in the taxation of agricultural income. In 
some regions (Oromia, Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella) the tax is levied on 
agricultural income with a progressive tax rate scale, while in other regions, the tax is 
a fixed amount per hectare of land; see The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
(May 2007), the New Federal Budget Grant Distribution Formula, House of 
Federation, Economic and social study Department, Addis Ababa, pp. 20-21. some 
say that this variation is superficial, arguing that the diktat comes from the center 
even in the area of agricultural income taxes; see Deso Chemeda (2008), Agricultural 
Income Taxation in Oromia, Senior Thesis, Faculty of Law, Addis Ababa University 
(unpublished).
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tax laws - probably upon realizing that they could no longer invoke federal tax 
laws to levy and collect regional income taxes.50
However, before we find fault with the practice of tax law-making in the 
regions, we must remember that the Federal tax law making process is not 
entirely innocent. when the Federal Government issued the current income tax 
law in 2002, it was barely aware of the niceties of the federal system - if the 
content of the 2002 income tax law is anything to go by. The 2002 income tax 
law covers not just federal income tax bases, but also state tax bases, and 
undesignated tax bases. The best illustration of this tax law’s overreach is to 
compare the 2002 income tax law with the income tax laws of Ethiopia back in 
the days when Ethiopia was a unitary state.51 There is surprisingly no difference 
between the two tax regimes in terms of income tax bases upon which tax was 
to be levied.
Another way is to compare the tax bases mentioned as subject to income 
tax under the 2002 tax law with the tax bases that are assigned exclusively to the 
regional governments and those that were ‘undesignated’ in the Constitution. Of 
the tax bases given to regional states under the Constitution, we may mention 
taxation of small businesses (called category C taxpayers). These taxpayers are 
subjects of regional state jurisdiction (unless they are organized as companies) 
by virtue of Article 97(4) of the Constitution.52 The income tax law of 2002 has 
detailed provisions on the assessment of the income and taxation thereof of 
small businesses. A presumptive assessment method (known as ‘standard 
assessment’) has been instituted for small businesses, with standard assessment 
tables for all types of small businesses attached to the 2002 income tax law.53
Of the undesignated taxes (at least undesignated in 2002), we may cite 
examples of taxes on royalties from patents and copyrights, taxes on interest 
accruing on bank deposits, and tax on transfer of capital.54 Since the 2002
50 See, for example, Oromia Regional Government Income Tax Proclamation No. 
74/2003, Megeleta Oromia; Amhara Regional Government Income Tax Proclamation 
No. 76/2003, Zikra Hig.
51 Compare the Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002 with the now repealed 
Proclamation No. 173/1961 (as amended).
52 Article 97(4) of the Constitution in part states: “States shall levy and collect profit... 
taxes on individual traders carrying out a business within their own territory.’ See, 
Constitution, supra note 29.
53 See Income Tax Proclamation, supra note 43,, Article 66; Council of Ministers 
Income Tax Regulations No. 78/2002, Federal Negarit Gazetta, 9th year, No. 18, 
Articles 21 and 22.
54 See Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002, supra note 43, Articles 31, 36 and 37; 
Some of these taxes have since 2002 been designated by the Joint Houses (see 
above); Berhanu Assefa, Supra note 41.
4(1) Mizan Law Rev. Income Tax Assignment under the Ethiopian Constitution 45
income tax law came out with little consciousness of the federal structure and 
division of powers, the regions simply relied upon this ostensibly federal tax law 
to levy and collect regional income taxes.55 it is only later that some of the 
regions even moved to issue their own tax laws. But the regions did not really 
issue their own tax laws if by issuing tax laws one implies a self-conscious, self- 
directed, deliberate process of law making. All of the regions that have issued 
their own laws have taken the federal tax law of 2002 as a model..56 The 
regional income tax laws are not just eerily similar to the federal tax law; the 
regions have not even bothered to sift out provisions that are clearly 
inappropriate from the vantage of regional income tax jurisdiction. For example, 
we find the same article (number as well as content) referring to a provision that 
is clearly not a regional income tax jurisdiction -dividend tax.57
4. Possible Problems and Challenges Ahead
A federal system of government by definition involves decision-making at 
multiple levels of government. While this decision-making process is more 
amenable to participatory government and rigorous procedures to reach a 
consensus, it can lead to gridlocks if different levels of government entertain 
divergent positions on reform in one or another direction.58 Divergent positions 
are to be expected from time to time between the federal government and the 
states. in contrast, in unitary governments, since decision-making at least in 
theory is made by the center and local governments have little autonomy of their 
own, we can expect reforms to go through more quickly than in federal 
systems.59
one possible problem that might arise from the assignment formula adopted 
in the Ethiopian Constitution is in the prospect of transforming the income tax 
system of Ethiopia. suppose the federal government is convinced that the
55 In defense of the federal government, some may argue that the Federal Government 
has the duty to nurse a nascent federal system by writing a ‘common tax legislation,’ 
from which the regional governments may take what they want. But the Federal 
Government could have followed less paternalistic approaches to assist the regional 
governments in this regard: like writing a non-binding model regional tax law.
56 Even the preamble of the federal income tax law is used verbatim.
57 See Article 34 of both Oromia Regional State and Amhara Regional State Income 
Tax Proclamations, supra note 50, and compare them with Article 34 of the Federal 
Income Tax Proclamation, supra note 43.
58 See Jessica R. Adolino and Charles H. Blake (2001), Comparing Public Policies, 
Issues and Choices in Six Industrialized Countries (Washington, DC: CQ Press), pp. 
66-68.
59 Ibid, p. 66.
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income tax system should be global.60 Because of the modality of assignment 
adopted in the Ethiopian Constitution, this type of reform will require not just 
reforming the tax system at the federal level but also the income tax systems of 
the regional governments. The federal government alone cannot succeed in 
transforming the income tax system from one that is schedular to a global 
income tax system. it requires the consent of all regions, which is usually 
difficult to obtain, if the regions exercise substantial autonomy in judgment. The 
only course of action open to the federal government is to seek constitutional 
amendment to push through that sort of tax reform. what would it take for a 
constitutional amendment to succeed, whatever is on the table? A constitutional 
amendment of this kind requires a 2/3rds majority vote in favor of the proposal 
by the joint Houses of Peoples’ Representatives and of the Federation and a vote 
by a majority in favor of the proposal by 2/3rds of the regional councils.61 Each 
of these requirements is a tremendous hurdle. we must remember that not all 
proposals for constitutional amendment are equal. Some amendments are so 
procedural and formal that they are guaranteed to slide through the hurdles very 
easily. Others are so radical that their chances of getting through these hurdles 
are very slim. Tax reform, particularly the one sought above, is of the latter type.
we must anticipate a great deal of resistance from the regional governments 
in particular. If the tax system were to become global, what would happen to 
regional tax powers? Would the tax reform lead to erosion and weakening of 
regional tax sources? These are some of the fears the regional governments 
would express and take actions to forestall. The fear that the tax reform might 
lead to the federal government taking over the tax powers reserved to the 
regions is enough to decide the results against the proposal. The regions wield 
substantial power over the course of constitutional amendments and they are 
going to use them if they perceive that the amendment (even if a minor one) 
affects their vested interests. As a result, many a sound proposal will be stymied 
for lack of support or enthusiasm for it at the regional level.
in rejoinder to this fear, the 2002 tax reforms may be held up as evidence 
that reform was possible after all. Seven years after the passing of the 
Constitution, the Federal Government of Ethiopia successfully carried out a 
major income tax reform without having to go through the rigmaroles of 
constitutional amendments. The 2002 tax reforms introduced what might be
60 For a brief distinction between schedular and global income tax systems, see foot note 
26 above.
61 See Constitution, supra note 29, Article 105(2).
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called ‘major’ changes in the income tax system of Ethiopia.62 If tax reform of 
that magnitude succeeded seven years after the Constitution, we may ask, why 
not in the future?
We must realize that the 2002 tax reforms occurred in an extremely 
auspicious political environment. They occurred at a time when both the federal 
government and the regional governments were controlled by a single party.63 
The ruling party is known for enforcing strict party discipline on its member 
organizations as well as affiliates.64 The delicate balance of ‘enforced 
consensus’ is held together for the moment by the ruling party’s system of party 
discipline. If and when opposition groups take control of either the federal 
bodies or one or two of the regions, the balance may not hold. If that happens 
through constitutional means (i.e., through free and fair elections), fierce battles 
will be fought over any serious proposal for an amendment of the Constitution - 
without which a tax reform of any magnitude is unlikely to succeed.
The other challenge and concern surrounding the division of revenues 
under the Ethiopian Constitution is whether it leaves the Federal Government 
with sufficient fiscal powers to achieve desirable fiscal policies of stabilization 
and distribution (For comparison of the assignment of revenues under the 
theories of fiscal federalism and under the Ethiopian Constitution, see Table 2 
below). Taxation is an important instrument of fiscal policy, and if the latter 
were to become effective, the federal government should wield sufficient 
powers of taxation to achieve desirable economic policies.65 The extent to which 
any government can effect desirable changes in tax rates and bases depends 
upon that government’s control over tax rates and tax bases for the purposes of 
implementing its fiscal policy as well distribution of income and wealth.66
62 The 2002 income tax reforms did not transform the income tax system of Ethiopia 
from a schedular one to a global system; but there were many other areas where 
major changes were introduced.
63 Suberu writes “not only does (sic) the EPRDF coalition and its affiliated parties 
control all governments at the federal and regional state levels by relatively large 
majorities, but the national leadership appears to have foisted a highly disciplined and 
intrusive central party structure on the whole federal administration system”, Rotimi 
Suberu, (2006), ‘Federalism and the Management of Ethnic Conflict: the Nigerian 
Experience’, in Turton, David, supra note 1 p. 85.
64 See Assefa Fiseha, supra note 1, pp. 156-158.
65 Girma Seyoum, ‘Fiscal Decentralization and Macroeconomic Management in 
Ethiopia’, in Eshetu Chole, supra note 1, at 135; Richard and Peggy Musgrave, supra 
note 3, pp. 11, 13; see also, John Kenneth Galbraith (7th printing, 1958), the Affluent 
Society (A Mentor Book), p. 247.
66 Girma Seyoum, in Eshetu Chole, supra note 1, p. 135; Richard and Peggy Musgrave, 
supra note 3, pp. 11, 13.
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Table 2: Comparison of Tax Assignment under the Ethiopian Constitution 
and the Theory of Fiscal Federalism
Type of tax Ethiopian
Constitution
Fiscal Federalist 
Theory
Article
income tax on Federal 
Government and International 
organization employees
Federal Federal/state 96(2)
income tax on federal 
government enterprises
Federal Federal 96(3)
income tax on lottery winnings 
and other games
Federal State 96(4)
income tax on air, rail and sea 
transport services
Federal Federal 96(5)
income tax on federally owned 
houses
Federal Federal 96(6)
Taxes on monopolies Federal Federal 96(8)
income tax on state government 
employees and employees of 
private enterprises
State Federal/state 97(1)
income tax on private farmers and 
agricultural cooperatives
State Federal /state 97(3)
Income tax on individual traders State Federal/state 97(4)
income tax on inland transport 
services
State Federal/state 97(5)
Income tax on rental of private 
houses and other properties
State Federal/state 97(6)
Income tax on state government 
owned enterprises
State Federal/state 97(7)
Income tax on employees of state 
government owned enterprises
State Federal/state 97(7)
Income tax on companies and 
shareholders
Federal/state
(concurrent)
Federal/state
(concurrent)
98(2)
Source: Ethiopian Constitution 1995), supra note 29, and Kibre Moges, in Eshetu 
Chole, supra note 1, p. 6.
4(1) Mizan Law Rev. Income Tax Assignment under the Ethiopian Constitution 49
The division of revenues adopted in the Constitution is not conducive to the 
attainment of optimal stabilization and distribution policy by the federal 
government. in the assignment of expenditure powers, the Ethiopian 
Constitution is broadly consistent with the theories of fiscal federalism - at least 
in the assignment of stabilization and redistribution powers.67 In the assignment 
of tax powers, however, it did not seem like this was taken into account- which 
may raise fears of countercyclical policies at the regional level. The Constitution 
may have followed some simple indicators for division of revenues between the 
two layers of Ethiopian federation, but in so doing it may have opened itself to 
some problems.
Let’s take some examples to illustrate our point. Assume that the Ethiopian 
economy has experienced a rise in prices, raising fears of inflation. In that 
situation, the theory recommends that the federal government should raise tax 
rates to reduce aggregate demand.68 This kind of policy can be effective only if 
the federal government has the constitutional power to raise tax rates that affect 
all households and businesses, at least a substantial number of households and 
business to have traction. under the current division of revenue powers, there 
are many households and businesses outside federal control. In the area of 
income taxes, the federal government has no control over employees of regional 
governments and private enterprises, the profits of sole proprietor businesses 
(whose size and number can only increase in the future) and more importantly, 
farmers. What if the regions were reluctant to go along with the ideas of raising 
taxes?
The same fears can be expressed over the capacity of the federal 
government to implement appropriate distribution policy, if need be through the 
instrumentality of taxes. There is a large swath of taxpayers out there who are 
not subject to federal tax powers. Can the federal government be effective in its 
distribution policies when these taxpayers are not directly affected by its tax 
policies? Can the federal government impose progressive income taxes with a 
view to redistributing income and wealth? It is doubtful.
Many federal systems permit income taxation at both layers of government 
(federal and state).69 So one may ask: why is Ethiopian revenue assignment a 
source of problem when others are not? The issue is not really about devolution 
of income taxes to the regions but the peculiar approach taken by the Ethiopian 
Constitution. In other federal systems, the federal government retains the
67 See Constitution, supra note 29, Article 51(2), (4), & (7).
68 Richard and Peggy Musgrave, supra note 3, p. 13.
69 state governments (and sometimes local governments) impose income taxes in the 
United States, Canada, and other federal systems; See Shah, supra note 8, pp. 105, 
142, 161, 330, and 355.
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capacity to reach significant numbers of taxpayers although the same taxpayers 
may be subject to state and/or local income tax jurisdiction. In Ethiopia, that is 
not really the case. The federal government cannot, through the income taxes, 
reach farmers, cooperatives, businesses organized as sole proprietorships, 
employees of state governments and employees of private enterprises. With 
these taxpayers beyond the reach of the federal income tax system, can the 
federal government be effective in its stabilizing and distributive role? it is once 
again very doubtful.70
Both stabilization and distribution are not matters of immediate concern in 
Ethiopia, however, for at least two reasons. First, interpersonal distribution of 
income and wealth is not an important policy in Ethiopia because of the level of 
the country’s economic development. In the future, as the economy grows, it 
may become an important agenda of the federal government. Secondly, there 
have not been divergent regional tax policies so far- the reasons of which have 
been alluded to above. There is a rule in the Federal Financial Administration 
Law71 which enjoins regions to harmonize their tax policies and systems with 
that of the federal government. It is not certain if the federal government can 
invoke this law as binding upon the regions because it is not after all the 
Constitution. So far, the regional governments are moving in perfect sync with 
the federal government. As far as the Constitution is concerned, there is no 
reason why regional governments cannot adopt a counter-federal tax policy. 
That can create problems down the line in the areas of stabilization of the 
economy and distribution of income and wealth.
Concluding Remarks
The revenue provisions of the Ethiopian Constitution are marked by their 
unusual specificity. It is surmised that the existing taxes at the time of the 
writing of the Constitution provided the drafters with the material from which 
the assignment was undertaken. The schedular approach of the Ethiopian 
income tax system, for example, had something to do with the way the 
Constitution divided revenue powers over income taxes in Ethiopia. The 
specificity of the Constitution is both good and bad. It is good because little is 
left for interpretation. The great details of the Constitution have this advantage:
70 Since the Constitution follows similar approaches with respect to other taxes (notably 
sales taxes), our doubts may even increase as we add more taxes into the mix.
71 See the Federal Government of Ethiopia Financial Administration Proclamation, 15th 
year, No. 56, Article 64(1) ; the repealed Federal Financial Administration 
Proclamation contained an identical prescription of tax harmonization; see Federal 
Government of Ethiopia Financial Administration Proclamation No. 57/1996, 
FederalNegarit Gazetta, 3rd year, No. 14 (now repealed and replaced), Article 58.
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in most cases it is clear which layer of government has what tax powers. That 
does not mean that there will be no disputes, but the disputes that can possibly 
arise in this regard have been considerably reduced owing to the specificity of 
the Constitution.
However, details in a constitution can have downsides, because it may 
arrest substantive tax reforms. As a result of the specificity of the Constitution, 
it is now almost inevitable that any serious tax reform at the national level must 
be accompanied or preceded by a measure of constitutional amendment to 
accommodate tax reform proposals. Constitutional amendment processes are 
notoriously slow and riddled with uncertainties. If the amendments are 
perceived as reorganizing taxation powers in the Constitution, for example, they 
are going to be resisted particularly if opposing political forces occupy either the 
federal bodies or the regional governments. The possible transition of Ethiopian 
income tax system from a schedular to a global tax system is used as an 
illustration of the gravity of the question, but the same argument can be made 
for reform of the tax system in so many other directions.
The revenue provisions of the Ethiopian Constitution can also be faulted for 
disregarding the dictum of fiscal federalists that taxes which are instruments of 
stabilization and distribution be in the hands of the federal government. The 
revenue provisions have devolved certain stabilizing or redistributing taxes to 
the regional governments. There is therefore fear that the federal government 
may not have enough powers on the tax side to effect desirable economic 
policies. The realization of this fact may again call for constitutional 
amendment, which, as pointed out earlier, is not easy to get through.
Finally, a disclaimer is in order. The argument put forward in this article 
may be misconstrued as an argument for centralizing certain powers or even 
worse concentrating powers in the hands of the federal government. Nothing of 
that sort is intended. All that the article calls for is the reorganization of certain 
tax powers without in any way diminishing the powers of the regions in the 
federal system of Ethiopia, but by meanwhile conferring adequate revenue 
powers upon the regions. _________ ■
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